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ABSTRACT: The meta-narratives of modern times are considered as the most significant 
factors impeding the development of the civil society’ that coincided with the western 
definition of democracy. Nevertheless, this article suggests that the real problem was 
institutional inadequacy, which was produced by lack of civic consciousness. The best 
evidence for this argument is the search by theoreticians for a civic consciousness despite 
their different ideological orientations. Indeed, the demise of meta-narratives in post-modern 
times does not tend to lead to a more civil society because of the vicissitude of this extant 
institutional inadequacy, which appears to be created by the decline of cultural understanding 
of civic consciousness. 
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ÖZET: Modern zamanların büyük söylemleri genellikle batı dünyasının demokrasi tanımına 
uygun bir sivil toplumun geliimini engelleyen en önemli faktörler olarak  
deerlendirilmektedir. Buna karın bu makale gerçek eksikliin sosyal bilinçsizliin 
dourduu kurumsal bir sorun olduunu ifade etmektedir. Bu önermenin en güzel kanıtı 
farklı ideolojik yönelimlerden gelen teorisyenlerin aynı sosyal bilinci aramı olmalarıdır. 
Nitekim, modern sonrası zamanlarda büyük söylemlerin geçerliliini yitirmi olmaları daha 
sivil bir toplumu ortaya çıkaramamaktadır çünkü aynı yetersizlik sosyal bilincin kültürel 
anlayıının zayıflamasının sonucu olarak devamlılıını sürdürmektedir. 
 
Anahtar kelimeler: Sivil toplum, demokrasi, sosyal bilinç. 
 
I. Introduction 
The Western discourse conscientiously supports the existence of civil society as the 
most crucial leitmotiv of democracy. The contribution of civil society organizations 
to democratic consolidation is undeniable. (Fuller, 1996: 51-53) This contribution is 
explicit even under a leftist interpretation, which assigns a mission of counter 
hegemonic action to civil society organizations for a better democratic consolidation. 
(Gramsci, 1971) Nevertheless, the elitist critique is still a significant concern about 
civil society because the oligarchic tendencies are latent within almost all of the 
organizations. (Controversy 1, C1 from now on) Furthermore, the renowned 
jeopardy still exists because certain organizations may find the chance to consolidate 
power, increase their popularity and start to damage the ongoing democracy. 
(Controversy 2, C2 from now on)  
 
This article suggests that what had once been suggested by Michels (Michels, 1971: 
279-293) in the above-mentioned formulation of C1 and C2 is an institutional 
question, which tends to be a latent but potent characteristic of civil society. In other 
words, both of the controversies are institutional questions rather than the ideological 
ones and the so called demise of ideology lacks the ability to overcome them. From 
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this point of view, the post-ideology era tends to suffer from the same controversies 
as far as a sort of civic consciousness, which here refers to an understanding that 
serves to live with the other(s), where the Other is assumed to represent a subject 
position defined in terms of culture. As a matter of fact, the hypothesis of this article 
suggests that not the ideological conflicts but the lack of civic consciousness 
accelerated the decline of the modernist belief in the self. Firstly, the concepts of 
democracy and civil society will be defined briefly in order to highlight this 
hypothesis. Secondly, starting from the Enlightenment, a genealogical analysis will 
be made until the so called demise of meta-narratives in order to point out that the 
lack of civic consciousness has always been a main concern of the theoreticians 
trying to ease the above-mentioned controversies that are independent from 
ideology. This analysis will show that rather than the contradictions among different 
ideological orientations the lack of civic consciousness as mentioned above had been 
the main source of the misinterpretation of democratic institutions. Indeed, various 
theoreticians with different ideological backgrounds attempted to solve the 
controversies of civil society by emphasizing the necessity of civic consciousness 
defined in terms of a cultural understanding. The latent controversies of civil society 
can be eased only by a civic consciousness no matter whether be the civil society 
characterized by harmonious and/or antagonistic relations. Consequently, the current 
era, which is characterized by the demise of ideologies, tends to suffer from the same 
controversies because the collapse of meta-narratives has not been filled by a civic 
consciousness yet. 
 
II. Civil Society and Democracy 
When civil society is based on some primordial phenomena, competition and rivalry 
amongst distinct groupings may lead to clashes. Most of the post-colonial countries 
in non-Western world seem to suffer from the fact that there are severe differences 
within the segments of society based on ethnic, religious, linguistic and tribal factors. 
It comes as no surprise, therefore, that countries with few civil liberties have limited 
political rights. A viable civil society creates favorable conditions for the 
development of democracy, and the existence of democracy enhances a country's 
development potential. (Entelis, 1996: 47) 
 
In the non-Western world, civil society is understood to be either a ‘means of 
existence’ or ‘subordination relationship’ or else a tool that may gain social upward 
mobility rather than an intermediate body that sustains the equilibrium between the 
society and the state. However, is not this exactly the same thing for the so called 
‘Western world’? To give an example: The PTA, Rotary Club, League of Women 
Voters, Young Democrats, American Medical Association, United Auto Workers, 
American Association of Retired Persons, National Rifle Associations, Sierra Club, 
Young Republicans, PEN Club, Knights of Columbus, National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People, American Civil Liberties Union, Arab-American 
Anti-Discrimination an Organization, Daughters of the American Revolution, 
Matachine Society Friends of the Earth as well as hundreds of other organizations 
are assumed to be the primary source of the public opinion in America that directly 
influence national political decisions for exactly the same reasons affiliated to the 
non-Western world. (Fuller, 1996: 51-539 What we do not like about the non-
Western world exist in the Western world in regularly organized institutions 
characterized by set of clandestine relations. Therefore, the controversies of civil 
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society do not arise from geographical differences in terms of a Western non-
Western dichotomy. On the contrary, these controversies are the outcomes of the 
lack of genuine civic consciousness no matter whether be it in the Western or non-
Western world. Indeed, like any social phenomenon, civil society does have a 
negative side regardless of geography. “Self- interest, prejudice and hatred cohabit 
with altruism, fairness and compassion, and the unrestrained free play of civil society 
is a chilling thought, not a warm and fuzzy one.”(Norton, 1995: 7-8) This negative 
aspect invokes a question about the extent in which it is possible to correlate civil 
society with democratic consolidation. 
 
In order to better elucidate the correlation between civil society and democracy we 
first need to decide about the conceptual connotations. It is sure that there are 
different definitions of concepts such as democracy, liberty rights and freedoms, 
tolerance etc. “But if it is possible to talk about the universality of Human Rights as a 
global doctrine, some consensus on the minimum standards, principles and rules 
must also be reached.” (Gemalmaz, 1989: 4) Therefore, it seems more appropriate to 
indicate firstly to what democracy refers. Within this context, regularly organized 
free and open elections, low barriers to participation in politics, genuine political 
competition and wide protection of civil liberties can be considered as preconditions 
of democracy. Amongst all of the independent variables, it is imperative that 
protection of civil liberties be associated to the existence of civil society. The article 
27 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights suggests that peoples have the right 
to participate in the cultural life of the community. The International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights also indicates the freedom of opinion and expression, 
peaceful assembly as well as the freedom of association, participation in public 
affairs and elections. Under the modern conceptualization of civil liberties, any 
governmental and or constitutional obstacle for the existence of civil society can not 
be compatible neither with the international modern definition of civil liberties nor 
democracy. However, it must be mentioned here that this argument does not suggest 
the existence of civil society as a precondition for democracy. Rather, it supports that 
any attempt that aims to obscure the very existence of civil society should be 
considered as anti-democratic. 
 
Describing the basic conditions for democratic consolidation is easy because the 
basic criteria have been explicitly defined and accepted by the international 
community. Nevertheless, these criteria mean nothing more than utile words, if there 
is no (civil) society characterized by loyalty to these concepts. Democracy should 
cover not only the basic rights mentioned above but also comprise a common 
understanding of fairness that facilitates the existence of various identity groups. 
(Taylor, 1992) That is to say, in order to be worth of something, democracy should 
prevail in coincidence with civil society. A society that does not have free 
individuals and group expression in non-political matters is not likely to make an 
exception for political ones. (Entelis, 1996: 47) It is explicit that a supportive 
democracy can not exist without a well developed civil society.  
 
A strong civil society is identified by a very ideal model in Mouzelis: (8) (Mouzelis, 
1995: 225-226) 
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1) The existence of rule-of-law conditions that effectively protect citizens from state 
arbitrariness. 
 
2) The existence of strongly organized non-state interest groups, capable of checking 
eventual abuses of power by those who control the means of administration and 
coercion. 
 
3) The existence of a balanced pluralism among civil society interests so that none 
can establish absolute dominance. 
 
It is very arduous to attain such an ideal model. The fraudulent aspect of civil society 
is real. Civil society can act as an intermediate phenomenon that gains impetus to 
democratic consolidation or as an agent, which guarantees the democratic 
substantiality under some certain conditions. Otherwise, there will always be a 
potential danger arising from the above-mentioned tendencies and fortuitous aspects 
of civil society. What is clear is that, it appears to be much easier to create positive 
conditions for democratic consolidation, when compared with the consequences of 
non-existence of civil society. Nevertheless, in any case the existence of civic 
culture, which indicates the ability to live with the other(s) whose identities are 
defined in terms of culture, is the main leitmotiv. 
 
III. Genealogical Independence of Civil Society 
Having pointed out the basic motives, which constitute a common ground among the 
pluralist, class and managerial perspectives it seems of utmost significance to refer to 
some of the theoreticians, who contributed the conceptual maturation of civil society. 
This genealogy is expected to be useful in the sense that it claims to offer an arena, 
wherein various approaches interact with each other for the purpose of attaining a 
more civil society. 
 
It seems as if it is possible to start the conceptual genealogy from Locke because he 
is generally considered among the first theoreticians, who had emphasized the 
significance of civil society. This does not necessarily mean that other political 
theorists, who cover a very wide range starting from Ancient Greek coming to 
current times, have emphasized civil society less than the others. Nevertheless, it is 
necessary to choose theoreticians who coincide with the above mentioned 
ideological lines. This is necessary to show that institutional specificities concretized 
by civic consciousness take place at the heart of the problematic rather than the 
ideological ones.  
 
Locke considers the state as a central authority, which had collected the power on the 
basis of a social contract. He argues that initially all individual property holdings are 
equal since the law of nature allows no individuals to process more than they can 
use. It is only when individuals agree to introduce money that property can be 
accumulated and the 'Possession of the Earth' becomes 'disproportionate and 
unequal'. Under these circumstances, 'inconveniences' degenerate into a situation of 
war pressing individuals to form a civil society and a liberal state. (Hoffman, 1995: 
105) Identifying social contract with a mere possession of earth would be a too 
simplistic method to understand the Lockean analysis of civil society. It is important 
to underline that civil society deviates from the state of nature by the creation of the 
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state. “Civil Society is distinguished from the state of nature by the presence of a 
common authority; the state of war is distinguished from the state of peace by the 
presence of force without right.” (Tarcov, 1992: 317) Interestingly state seems to be 
the reason which leads to the creation of civil society. What makes Locke crucial is 
his approach to the arbitrary usage of force by the central authority. He offers people 
the right to involve in a rebellion when an arbitrary force with no right is imposed 
upon them. In other words, the right for rebellion is assumed to be a phenomenon 
that protects the people from the arbitrary hegemony of the state. However, he also 
emphasizes that people do not tend to rebel against the central authority due to some 
certain characteristics. Firstly, people are slow and in many situations they tend to 
refer to the former authority which has once imposed a force with no right upon 
them. Secondly, people are to a large extent illiterate. They feel oppressed by the 
illegitimate usage of force, but they do not know how to cure them. Finally, people 
are indifferent to such events and they cannot decide whether oppression of the few 
can also jeopardize the whole. (Tarcov, 1992: 322-323)  
 
To interpret Locke s` arguments in modern terms, we can argue that a legitimization 
crisis and an effectiveness problem with regard to the state apparatus may lead to 
opposition movements of the people. Considering the fact that, people lack the 
potency to affect political outcomes, they need some organized associations, which 
have overcome some problems attributed to ordinary individuals such as slowness, 
illiteracy and indifference so to speak in Lockean terms. This is exactly what Locke 
had once proposed; people needed to be guided. This kind of interpretation of Locke 
reminds us of a modern concept that had been considered as a protective mechanism 
of the individual from the state: that is to say, the civil society in modern terms. The 
most problematic aspect of this debate is the content of the correlation. Individual 
rights and the necessity of existence of the state may seem incompatible at first sight 
because the second one imposes some limitations on individuals. This dilemma of 
liberalism still exists and Lockean analysis can not offer a sound answer to C1 and 
C2. Within this perspective, the negative aspects of C1 and C2 can be eased if civil 
society can be deliberated as an intermediate agent between the state and society in 
order to attenuate contingent frustrations. Whilst, it seems impossible to restrict the 
content of civil society within a very confined understanding. Explicitly, Lockean 
analysis is far away from offering sound solutions to C1 and C2 without accepting 
civic consciousness as real. Accepting civic consciousness as real will contradict the 
competitive characteristic of Lockean society. To go beyond this rough interpretation 
of civil society, we also need to refer some other approaches that built upon than 
liberal understanding of Locke.   
 
Following very crucial points of views that may be derived from the arguments of 
Paine, civil society turns into a more comprehensible character. (Paine, 1969: 165-
168) Not only his theoretical contributions but also Paine’s impact on Hegel should 
be mentioned. This impact is interesting because Paine and Hegel are generally 
accepted the preliminary theoreticians of two contradictory ideological lines, which 
were concretized in terms of liberalism and dialectical materialism consecutively. 
According to Paine, the existence of man, by definition offers him some natural 
rights such as the intellectual rights, or rights of the mind in addition to the rights of 
acting as an individual for his own comfort and happiness, which do not injure the 
natural rights of others. This limitation seems plausible because both C1 and C2 are 
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no more problematic, if individuals can successfully pursue their own comfort 
without endangering that of others. Nevertheless, the real world is far away from this 
idealization. Respect for others is difficult to define because individuals may adhere 
to different definitions. Indeed looking for respect for others necessarily puts civic 
consciousness as the most essential problem. Having recognized this deficiency, 
Paine develops a formula, which is produced from the idea of mutual dependence. 
When man becomes a part of the society, he attains his civil rights some of which are 
inherited from the natural rights. “The mutual dependence and reciprocal interest 
which man has upon man, and all the parts of a civilized community upon each other, 
create the great chain of connection which holds it together.” (Parker, 1983: 85)  
 
In order to protect the civil rights, there occurs inter-dependence amongst man and 
the communities. Furthermore, man has to be protected from central authority, which 
has been created in the sense of a social contract. “According to Paine, the power of 
the state must be restricted in favor of civil society because within all individuals, 
there is a natural propensity for society: existing before the formation of states, this 
natural sociability predisposes individuals to establish peaceful and happy relations 
of competition and solidarity based only on reciprocal self interest and a shared 
sense of mutual aid.” (Keane, 1988: 45) This formulation tries to solve C1 and C2 by 
counting on the essence of interaction among civil society organizations. In other 
words, if individuals are allowed to involve in various interest groups, C1 and C2 are 
expected to be minimized because only the people who adhere to democratic 
principles will be supported by others. On the contrary, a civil society organization 
will explicitly lose popular support. Therefore, antagonism appears to be an essential 
specificity because the participants’ competitions with each other are considered as a 
natural phenomenon. Nevertheless, there is still a need for civic consciousness the 
absence of which would make it impossible to compare the essences of different civil 
society organizations. 
 
Despite similarities in terms of civil society’s being the reflection of rights and 
freedoms, Hegel s` concern on the relations between the state and society is very 
different from that of Paine. “First, in striking contrast to Paine s` account, civil 
society (burgerliche Gesellschaft) is conceived not as a natural condition of freedom 
but as a historically produced sphere of ethical life (Sittlichkeit) p`ositioned  `between 
the simple world of the patriarchal household and the universal state.” (Keane, 1988: 
50)   
 
In other words, civil society takes place in-between the two primordial elements of 
the system, family and the state, both of which are assumed to be shaped by 
Sittlichkeit. Hegel can be criticized due to the fact that family and civil society are 
considered to be subordinate bodies of the state. However, it must also be 
remembered that civil society has a very special role for Hegelian approach. His 
main contribution with regard to the relations between the state and civil society can 
be better pointed out, when the deviation of civil society from its classical meaning 
by increasing its potency as a means of the protector of the society against contingent 
corruptions within the state apparatus is indicated. Hegelian conceptualization also 
solves C1 and C2 by differentiating genuine civil society organizations from the 
corrupted one. That is to say, a society becomes a genuinely civil, when individuals 
attain Sittlichkeit and go beyond a sheer understanding of utility maximization in 
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terms of Benthamite approach. Burgerliche Gesellschaft is considered as the product 
of the modern capitalist economy, which needs to be improved by Sittlichkeit. Civil 
society can be reached if and only if the individuals stop to consider themselves and 
also each other as Benthamite utility maximizers unrelated to others, except being 
potential buyers and sellers of commodities.  
 
To have Sittlichkeit is nothing more than the realized form of civic consciousness, 
which had suggested a certain level of civic culture as the most necessary condition 
of attaining civil society. What defines civil society as civil, as opposed to a political 
society, is its division into various classes and estates, each with its own distinctive 
outlook, interests, and ways of life. These estates- the peasantry, the business class, 
and the “universal” class of state functionaries- provide the crucial links, or 
“mediations”, between the “natural society” of the family and the more abstract 
rationality of the state. (Smith, 1989: 140-142) The most striking aspect of the 
Hegelian doctrine can only be understood when it is elaborated not only within the 
circumstances of his era, but also within the developments of the modern times. This 
perspective can make Hegelian concept of corporation (Korporation) evident. 
Otherwise, Hegelian corporatism can offer a very suitable basis for C2 as it had once 
been in the case of Mussolini’s Italy. In other words, despite the fact that Hegel 
defines the preconditions for attaining genuine civil society through Korporation, the 
C1 and C2 still remain unsolved, if civic consciousness (Sittlichkeit so to use 
Hegelian conceptualization) is not realized. It would be so simplistic to refuse the 
civil society characterized by clandestine interest relations and/or anti democratic 
inclinations by suggesting that such as system is not genuinely civil. On the contrary, 
a civil society is an organic structure that is characterized by the existence of 
different types of Korporation characterized by different levels of (anti)humanistic 
understanding. Therefore, the most viable solution to C1 and C2 would be adherence 
to variety and plurality in terms of Korporation if and only if civic consciousness 
characterizes the essence of the participants. 
 
Indeed, an analysis of Hegel s` corporatism indicates that, he considers these 
organizations as a tool to guarantee freedom in modern terms. When we consider the 
quasi-democratic constitutions in modern times, especially in developing countries, it 
can be pointed out that the main concern of the central authority is to limit and 
control the activities of associations. Not surprisingly, the less democratic a regime 
is, it is more likely to limit and control the activities of corporations and associations, 
which are assumed to be contingent enemies of the regime. Hence, it is possible to 
indicate that the existence of corporations is the explicit sign of tolerance, which also 
can be considered as a very significant ingredient of democratic approaches. Within 
this perspective, Hegel s` corporate doctrine should be conceived under following 
functions: (Smith, 1989: 143-144) 
 
1) Like Montesquieu before him and de Tocqueville later, Hegel saw the 
corporations as essential to the structure of modern freedom. The freedom to 
associate, even more than freedom of speech, is crucial to modern freedom...these 
intermediary bodies prevent either excessive centralization from the state above 
or excessive atomization from the market below. 
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2) The corporation has important welfare functions, especially for its indigent 
members. Hegel was no advocate of the welfare state or the planned economy. 
These functions, providing for people's substantive wants, were not a part of 
state's role... Civil society produces a class of people who, through no fault of 
their own, are reduced to penury and thus require a “safety net” to protect them 
from the vicissitudes of the market. This is where the corporation comes in.  
 
3) The third function of the corporation is to provide political representation for its 
members. Hegel opposed the system of direct suffrage, thinking it would lead to 
atomization and apathy, and instead favored a form of corporate representation in 
the legislature or estates the corporation could serve as a link, or “mediation”, 
between the state and civil society. In this way, the corporations could better 
defend the aggregate interests of their members by giving them a voice in politics.   
 
This brief analysis indicates that the Latin American authoritarianism and Italian 
fascism have misinterpreted Hegel s` arguments in order to constitute a framework 
for their ideologies. This is exactly what this article suggests. The controversies of 
civil society in the form of C1 and C2 are latent and potent which are open to be 
activated when the absence of civic consciousness allow the circumstances to 
exacerbate them. What Hegel suggested was the necessity of autonomous or quasi-
autonomous organizations for sustaining the balance between the members of the 
society and the state. Therefore, a sort of check and balance system was necessary. 
Nevertheless, it should also be mentioned that Hegel favors organized groups rather 
than the individuals. This point of view, of course, increases the significance, and 
though the effectiveness of some members of the relevant organized groups that is to 
say the elites. As smith points out, “on the whole, Hegel s` form of corporatism is 
probably closest to the contemporary experiences of Scandinavia, France, and 
Britain, with their highly structured relations between interest organizations and 
administrative bodies.” (Smith, 1989: 145) Interestingly what makes the cases of 
Scandinavia, France, and Britain so close to the Hegelian understanding of civil 
society arises from the existence of a central mechanism, which wisely controls and 
balances the corporate activities. Nevertheless, it is explicit that such a solution can 
be viable as afar as the central mechanism keeps itself independent from C1 and C2. 
This is why Hegel assigns supremacy to the central mechanism, which he thinks as 
the state. It is assumed that such a wise state is possible because the citizens of the 
state are members of families and members of civil society. “Family and civil society 
are actual components of the state, actual spiritual existences of the will; they are the 
state's modes of existence; family and civil society make themselves into the state.” 
(O M`alley, 1994: p. 2) Indeed, the family and civil society are components of the 
state, which is assumed to have a sort of ideal wisdom. 
 
In contrast to Hegelian idealism, civil society is attributed a more decisive role 
within the Weberian approach. The necessity to refer to Weber at this point arises 
from the fact that he successfully focuses on two very crucial terms: “domination” 
and “legitimization”. Indeed, Weber s` definition of the modern state includes both 
domination and legitimacy which are crucial not only for his theoretical discourse 
but also for the modern view of the contemporary politics. The first one of these 
concepts (domination) reflects the inclination of state to increase its area of 
influence, while the second one (legitimacy) draws its maximum capacity to impose 
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its predominance. “The modern state is a community for the domination of the 
institutional content, who not only has searched (with success) to monopolize a 
legitimate physical violence within certain limits as a tool of domination, but also 
collected the material conditions of administration in the hands of the executors.” 
(Weber, 1959: 108) 
 
If civil society organizations are analyzed within an institutionalist perspective then 
it may be concluded that the same interaction in terms of domination and legitimacy 
exist. Consequently, Weber urges certain principles in order to minimize the risks, 
which are defined as C1 and C2 for this article. The first principle is individual self 
determination, which derives ultimately from the primary value of the dignity of all 
human beings who, as persons, should act out of their own free initiative and should 
never be subjected to external determination. (Mommsen, 1989: 31-32) This 
principle seems to be potent enough to give answers to both C1 and C2 but again in 
terms of antagonism. First of all, individuals, who have dignity, are expected to be 
free to make their own choices but also wise enough not to damage others. As a 
matter of fact, Weberian approach offers a precondition, which coincides with the 
idea of self determination with the unity of society. In addition, Weber emphasizes 
what may when individuals lack the above mentioned dignity (civic consciousness in 
this article or Sittlichkeit so to use Hegel’s words) There is on the other hand, the 
insight that all social relations are ultimately relations of domination and that even 
the different types of democracy do not basically overcome domination, that is, the 
external determination of individuals by other individuals. (Mommsen, 1989: 31-32) 
 
Therefore, Weber considers domination, at least tendency towards domination, as 
real. This is why he suggests that best democracy can create the optimum conditions 
in which the individual's own initiative is subjected to the least possible restrictions. 
(Mommsen, 1989: 31-32) Within this context, civil society (organizations) should be 
considered as a tool, which contributes to democracy by minimizing the possible 
restrictions. Above all, Weberian approach is plausible because of its being able to 
elucidate how domination and legitimacy are the parts of the real life and how the 
contingent restrictions upon individual rights and freedom nay be minimized.  
 
Interestingly, despite the fact that Weber and Marx are accepted to be the precursors 
of two conflicting ideologies, they emphasize similar aspects in terms of civil 
society. “Marx clearly subsumes the State under civil society, and it is civil society 
that defines the State and sets the organization and goals of the state in conformity 
with the material relations of production at a particular stage of capitalist 
development.”(Carnoy, 1980: 67) That is to say, civil society, off course with 
different connotations, is attributed a sort of supremacy by Marx. Indeed, Gramscian 
analysis clearly explicates how Marxist conceptualization of civil society correlates 
with C1 and C2. Hence, Marx and Gramsci can be considered close to each other 
because they both attribute a very crucial role to civil society in the capitalist 
development. However, Gramsci differs from Marx, who considered civil society 
within the relations in production that is to say, the structure. The peculiar 
connotation in Gramscian analysis arises from the fact that civil society is understood 
to be ideological, cultural, spiritual and intellectual manifestation of socio-political 
life, which also constitutes the super-structure. (Cot and Mounier, 1974: 58) This is 
why it has supremacy and this is why it is open to manipulations. Whilst, in both 
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cases civic consciousness, as described in this article, had been a significant concern, 
and even basic assumption, for starting a counter hegemonic action which claims to 
contribute to democratic consolidation. 
 
It should also be mentioned that Gramsci s` approach deviates from that of Weber. 
“According to Buci-Glucksmann, Gramsci avoided the institutionalism and 
institutional determinism of Weber, because the apparatus of hegemony is spanned 
by the class struggle: the institutions that form the hegemonic apparatus only have 
meaning in the Gramscian analysis when set in the context of the class struggle and 
the dominant class that expands its power and control in the civil society through 
these same institutions.” (Carnoy, 1980: 70) antagonism explicitly is the main 
assumption of this interpretation, which derives its raison d’être from antagonistic 
characteristics of defined identity groups. Indeed, civil society and political society 
with hegemony and coercion are the two aspects of the class domination. (Cot and 
Mounier, 1974: 59) Considering hegemony as the ideological imposition of the 
dominant classes in civil society upon the subordinates, Gramsci put it in between 
consent and coercion as a kind of synthesizer. Hegemonic tendencies control the 
realm of the relations both in the state and civil state. However, it must also be 
mentioned that in contrast to Lenin, Gramsci endows a primacy to civil society in the 
fight against the hegemonic existence of the dominant class ideology. In other words, 
civil society possesses the mission of involving in a counter action against the 
dominant class hegemony via expensing its own ideological values. (Cot and 
Mounier, 1974: 57-65) (Gramsci, 1971: 181-246) In any case civic consciousness is 
necessary not only in order to successfully complete the counter hegemonic action 
but also in order to avoid the contingency of C1 and C2 prior, during and in the 
aftermath of the historical breakthrough. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
This article indicated that the two basic controversies of civil society are institutional 
issues, which can be eliminated only by a general civic culture. Personal interests, 
the realm of the elites, secret bargains, cooperation and rivalry inside and amongst 
the associations may be taken for granted due to their being compatible with the 
essence of liberalism. Obviously, these factors prostrate the intensity of the 
assumptions that suggest the existence of civil society as the precondition of 
democratic consolidation. Nevertheless, increasing the number and diversity of civil 
society organizations, as it is being ardently supported by most of the current 
theoreticians, can not be sufficient for overcoming these controversies without civic 
consciousness.  
 
There were many expectations from the end of ideological conflicts, which was to 
accelerate the civic maturation of the society. This euphoria was too far away from 
reflecting the real problematic. In coincidence with the rising amount and speed of 
the circulation of the goods and services, the diversity and amount of civil society 
organizations are constantly increasing. Within this context, no one can deny that the 
demise of meta-narratives served for the economic integration of the world. 
However, not too many things have changed with regard to civil society. What made 
the civil society of modernist era to collapse was not a consequence of ideological 
conflicts. Rather, the main reason of collapse emerged from the institutional 
problems described as the controversies of civil society in this article. Indeed, the 
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demise of modern era did not lead to civic maturation. The reason for this is clear. 
Today’s world allows everything to be traded without forgetting the fact that it is 
possible to buy and sell the cultural products not the culture per se. Consequently, 
the rising number of civil society organizations does not have much sense because 
the problematic of the above-mentioned theoreticians trying to solve the 
controversies of civil society still exists: The lack of civic consciousness based on 
culture. 
 
 
References 
ALFORD, R. & FRIEDLAND, R. (1985) Powers of theory : capitalism the state 
and democracy. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
BIRNBAUM P. (1975) Le Pouvoir politique. Paris, Dalloy. 
CARNOY, M. (1980) The sate and political theory. Princeton, UP. 
COT, J. P. & MOUNIER, J.P. (1974) Pour une sociologie politique. Paris, Tonce.  
DUNLEAVY, P. & O L`EARY, B. (1987) The new right, Theories of State : The 
Politics of Liberal Democracy, Macmillan. 
DUNN, J. (1992) Democracy the unfinished journey. Oxford, Oxford University 
Press.  
FULLER, G.E. (1996) Demokrasi tuzaı. Istanbul, Altın Kitaplar. 
GELLNER, E. (1994) Conditions of liberty - civil society and its rivals. New York, 
Penguin Press. 
GEMALMAZ, M. S. (1989) Turkish type of democracy. Istanbul, Amaç. 
GRAMSCI, A. (1971) Selections from the prison notebooks. Lawrence and Wishart. 
MOUZELIS, N. (1995) Modernity, late development and civil society, in J.A. HALL  
(Ed.), Civil Society, Cambridge, Polity Press,. 
HELD D. (1983) States and societies. New York, New York University Press. 
HIGLEY, J.; BURTON, M. and FIELD, L. (1990) In defense of the new elite 
paradigm, American Sociological Review, Vol. 55. 
HIGLEY, J. & GUNTHER, R (1992). Elites and democratic consolidation in latin 
America and Southern Europe. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
HOFFMAN, J. (1995) Beyond the state. Cambridge, Polity Press. 
JOHN A. & HALL, J. A. (1994) Coercion and consent : studies on the modern 
state. Cambridge, Polity Press. 
KEANE, J. (1988) Civil society and the state. Verso. 
MICHELS R. (1971) Les Partis politiques. Paris, Flammarion. 
MOMMSEN, J.W. (1989) The political and social theory of Max Weber. 
Cambridge, Polity Press. 
ENTELIS J.P. (1996) Civil society and the authoritarian temptation in Algerian 
politics : Islamic democracy Versus The Centralized State, in A.R. NORTON 
(Ed.), Civil Society in the Middle East, Leiden, E. J. Brill. 
O M`ALLEY, J. (1994) Marx` early political writings. Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press. 
PAINE, T. (1969) The rights of man. Penguin Publishers. 
PARRY, G. & MORAN, M. (1992) Democracy and democratization. London, 
Routledge. 
SMITH, S. B. (1989) Hegel`s critique of liberalism. Chicago, Chicago University 
Press. 
 
Mert BLGN 
 
 
70 
 
TAYLOR, C. (1992) Multi-culturalism and the politics of recognition, Cambridge, 
Harvard University Press 
TARCOV, N. (1992) Locke s` second treatise and t`he best fence against rebellion., 
in J. LOSCO & L. WILLIAMS (Eds.), Political Theory, New York, St. Martin s` 
Press. 
WEBER, M. (1959) Le Savant et le politique. Paris, Union Générale d E`ditions. 
 
